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“China has 
become the 
leading 
influence in 
the world of 
international 
development 
architecture.”
 China’s Comprehensive 
 Strategic and Cooperative 
 Partnership with Africa
With astonishing rapidity, in the past 
two years China has become the leading 
influence in the world of international 
development architecture. Its Silk Roads 
‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative, 
which President Xi Jinping proposed in 
2013, with details spelled out in a roadmap 
that the State Council authorised in 
2015, looks to create a new economic 
geography: a Silk Road economic belt 
reaching across Eurasia, linking vertically 
with a twenty-first century maritime Silk 
Road that stretches from Europe through 
the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and 
the Arabian Sea, then on to Southeast 
Asia, and finally China’s coastal regions, with 
further branches to the South Pacific and 
Africa. The ‘Visions and Actions’ roadmap is 
advanced ‘in [the] face of the weak recovery 
of the global economy and complex 
international and regional situations’.
Besides establishing the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, hosting 
the BRICS New Development Bank and 
setting up new multilateral development 
institutions, China is also launching a 
set of intellectual and political fora: the 
International Development Knowledge 
Centre in Beijing, linked to the State 
Council; the Silk Road Think Tank 
Network, which held its first meeting in 
Madrid, Spain, in September 2015; the 
proposed Heads of States Forum for 
the Silk Roads OBOR initiative; and the 
Academy for South–South Cooperation 
and Development and Centre for New 
Structural Economics at Peking University 
in Beijing. At the United Nations (UN) 
Summit that adopted the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in New York 
in September 2015, President Xi also 
announced a US$2bn fund for South–
South Cooperation to implement the 
SDGs, and a US$3.1bn South–South Fund 
for Climate Change Cooperation. And 
on a tour of the Middle East in January 
2016, the president called on all parties 
to join the circle of friends of the OBOR 
and announced significant financing for 
development across the region.
The Johannesburg Action Plan’s 
comprehensive, strategic and cooperative 
partnership is positioned in this new 
world economic and political geography 
as seen from Beijing. It is explicitly 
set in the South–South development 
cooperation mode founded in Bandung, 
Indonesia, in 1955 and embedded in the 
principles of Chinese foreign aid set out 
by Zhou Enlai in 1964 in Accra, Ghana. 
The African Union (AU)’s Vision 2063 
and its first ten-year implementation 
plan form the basis of the Johannesburg 
Action Plan. What drives China’s 
attention to Africa at this point are: 
(1) establishing a strategic balance to the 
United States (US) pivot to Asia; and 
(2) the prospect of a global future in which 
the African population rises from 1 billion 
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to more than 2 billion by 2050, contributing 
the largest increase in the global labour force, 
some 400 million, over a period when China’s 
demographics and its economic rebalancing 
will generate a large-scale export of low-wage 
jobs in tradable industries. This is the window 
of opportunity the action plan is aiming at.
It is this symbiotic potential that differentiates 
the action plan from the India–Africa 
Framework for Strategic Cooperation, agreed 
in New Delhi in October 2015 under the theme 
‘Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic 
and Transformative Development Agenda’. 
Both constitute comprehensive multisectoral 
agendas, positioned in South–South mode 
and with follow-up mechanisms to be defined 
in the months ahead. Clearly a competitive 
element is at work here, with China bringing 
its Silk Roads geography to bear, and India its 
‘centuries-old’ relationship with Africa. 
Inside the Johannesburg Action Plan 
The action plan consists of an extensive set of 
sectoral objectives, action plans and fora for 
knowledge exchange and followthrough. At 
a cursory glance it could be dismissed as just 
another international laundry list. That would 
be wrong on two counts. 
First, it presents a strategic development 
agenda that tackles deep intersectoral 
coordination issues involved in launching 
economic takeoff and dealing with spillovers 
in the current African context, including the 
development–security nexus.
On the development front, the action plan 
embraces modern transport infrastructure, 
energy networks and logistics management; 
rural development, the ocean economy and 
food value chains; industrial partnering linked 
to a hefty build-up in Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI); and large-scale Chinese 
tourism in Africa. Ecosystem programmes 
and wildlife protection link to tourism 
development and livelihoods for poverty 
reduction. Public health systems, higher 
education and professional and vocational 
training link to the economic programme. The 
‘digitalisation’ of communications and media 
across the continent link to the proposed 
cooperation on e-commerce. As an integral 
part of these development efforts, China is 
investing in security, financing the African 
Peace and Security Architecture and its 
military capacities, and contributing to African 
peace processes and armed peacekeeping 
operations within AU and UN frameworks.
Second, each element of the plan is associated 
with specific actions, and new or established 
working arrangements or fora. Examples 
include a China–Africa 2016–20 railway 
cooperation plan, a China–Africa regional 
aviation programme, the China–Africa Science 
and Technology Partnership Plan, and the 
Joint Research Centre on Biodiversity. Existing 
or proposed China–Africa fora cover:
• Business cooperation;
• Health;
• Energy and natural resources;
• Marine economy;
• Media cooperation;
• Poverty reduction. 
The FOCAC Think Tank Forum system is 
charged with analytical research on the 
industrial partnering and capacity-building 
process that aims to shift Chinese low-wage 
export industries onto African export 
platforms.
Organisational arrangements for 
implementing the action plan
Clearly the action plan involves huge tasks of 
coordination and monitoring. The FOCAC 
follow-up mechanism is being strengthened 
accordingly. 
First, the AU, which became a full FOCAC 
member in 2012, has been invited to establish 
a representative office in Beijing, China having 
already opened a Mission of China to the AU in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Second, China is to co-
chair a FOCAC review with South Africa (as the 
host of FOCAC VI), working with the FOCAC 
follow-up mechanism and the Group of African 
Ambassadors in Beijing, to come up with 
proposals for an ‘optimal follow-up mechanism’, 
including the incorporation of existing and newly 
established sub-fora emerging in Johannesburg. 
The FOCAC follow-up mechanism has a 
secretariat located in China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which coordinates activities across the 
Chinese policy and implementation system. On 
the African side, the AU engages in strategic 
dialogue on China–Africa transformation issues, 
and the eight Regional Economic Communities 
and existing international partnerships; for 
example, on infrastructure and agriculture, are 
woven into the action plan. 
It remains to be seen how the African side 
might manage its political buy-in and agency 
at continental, regional and country levels. 
The ownership issue is of course fundamental, 
involving complex political economy issues as 
China seeks to help African countries to transform 
beyond their colonial economic geography, 
circumvent predatory elites and navigate 
leapfrogging technologies and business models.
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“To 2050, Africa 
[will] contribute 
the largest 
increase in the 
global labour 
force when 
China will [be] 
generating a 
large-scale 
export of low-
wage jobs in 
tradable 
industries.”
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Financing
Building on previous FOCAC provisions, the 
action plan gives priority to funding productive 
investment to energise the development process.
While social development cooperation is also 
a key element, aid will increase only ‘gradually’ 
from its current level, which is in the order of 
US$3.5bn, or 50 per cent of China’s estimated 
US$7bn of official development assistance-like 
foreign aid. 
China’s broader international development 
finance, however, with its two major policy 
banks, the China Development Bank (CDB) 
and Export-Import (Exim) Bank at the centre, 
is another matter. 
Under its Economic Cooperation heading, the 
action plan provides: 
• US$35bn in concessional loans and credit 
lines for 2016–18 (up from US$30bn in 
FOCAC V);
• The new US$10bn China–Africa Production 
Capacity Cooperation Fund to support 
industry partnering;
• Increases in the existing China–Africa 
Development Fund (for equity investment) 
from US$5bn to US$10bn and the special 
loans programme for small and medium-
sized enterprises from US$1bn to US$6bn. 
Beyond these provisions, the Chinese side 
‘plans to increase China’s stock of direct 
investment in Africa to US$100bn in 2020 
from US$32.4bn in 2014’. While this is clearly 
an aspirational figure (some US$10bn per 
annum on average compared with a Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce figure of US$3.5bn for 
2014), it goes alongside the joint undertaking 
to ‘encourage and support China’s labour 
intensive industries to move to Africa’. 
These perspectives can be seen against 
an overall financial footprint of Chinese 
enterprises in Africa in 2014 of US$70bn-
worth of contracts signed and US$46bn-
worth of contracts completed (as recorded by 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce), and in the 
context of Africa as the fastest-growing world 
market for FDI.
The development paradigm and 
systemic implications
The development paradigm embedded in 
the Johannesburg Action Plan and the AU 
Vision 2063 is the ‘Lewis process’ of economic 
development, with labour moving from 
low-productivity subsistence agriculture to 
higher-productivity employment in the formal 
sector, notably manufacturing. 
China is now, in effect, looking to export its 
‘Lewis process’ to Africa, implying a fast-
growing employment-rich formal sector, 
largely urban, but with rural enterprise 
expanding also to organise value chains, 
notably to feed African cities. Professor Dani 
Rodrik of Harvard University is pessimistic 
that this kind of structural transformation 
is a feasible growth vector in Africa. 
Rodrik perceives African labour, in fact, 
to be moving into informal service-sector 
employment. But extensive research by 
Brookings, the African Development Bank 
and UNU-WIDER provides theoretical and 
evidential grounds for a more optimistic 
prognosis.
Thus, opening up the neo-classical black 
box of public and private entrepreneurship 
generates an agenda based around dynamic 
capacity development that goes well 
beyond the standard donor agenda of the 
past three decades, which in effect took 
infrastructure investment and industrial 
policy out of play. Essentially, no net 
infrastructure investment in Africa took 
place in the 1980s–90s. Enterprise mapping 
of African economies has shown just how 
limited are the number and scale of African 
enterprises, with an associated absence of 
cluster and agglomeration dynamics and 
the learning-by-doing processes that drive 
economic growth.
The action plan strategy in fact involves 
three fronts. The first entails moving Chinese 
labour-intensive industries to Africa, bringing 
with them their already established large-scale 
market penetration in the US, Europe and 
China and the tacit knowledge, including 
management, design and training skills, of 
Chinese entrepreneurs. Showing how this 
can rapidly generate large job creation and 
export revenues in a few countries is designed 
to inspire adoption across Africa of the 
appropriate public policies and facilitation 
cultures and institutions, drawing in more 
investors, local and foreign. The second front 
is a big push on the regional infrastructure 
needed to turn landlocked countries into 
land-connected countries and to link up 
consumer markets, labour pools and energy 
supplies, exploiting the market opportunities 
now emerging from African demographics 
and urbanisation dynamics. And a third front 
is to take forward Africa’s already burgeoning 
digital economy, where Chinese global 
enterprises have provided much of the digital 
infrastructure and are now bringing low-cost 
smartphones and new business models for 
e-commerce.
“The action plan 
strategy involves 
three fronts: 
moving Chinese 
labour-intensive 
industries to 
Africa, a big 
push on regional 
infrastructure 
and taking 
forward Africa’s 
burgeoning 
digital economy.”
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Policy recommendations
Towards a comprehensive economic strategy for Africa 
With infrastructure connectivity, economic diversification and employment creation 
at its core, the action plan offers the prospect that a rising Africa with its fast-
increasing young population will contribute dynamically to global development in 
the coming decades. China’s long experience in Africa indicates how challenging 
this will be on all sides, hence the fundamental importance of the potential 
qualitative impacts of the Johannesburg Action Plan. 
• The new FOCAC mechanisms and action plan should invigorate African processes 
for working on national, regional and cross-regional infrastructure to create 
export platforms and new regional and urban dynamics as growth drivers. African 
platforms for strengthening African agency and capabilities will be at a premium. 
• The action plan constitutes a benchmark for comprehensive Africa strategies from 
other countries, notably the US (no such programmatic strategy emerged from 
the White House Africa Summit of August 2015), the European Union (which is 
looking to develop a comprehensive African strategy in 2016) and Japan (which 
holds its next Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) 
meeting at the end of 2016). FOCAC has clearly inspired the comprehensive 
India–Africa Strategic Cooperation Framework. Africa can benefit from this 
kind of competitive interest and from the new level of interest from private 
entrepreneurs. All development actors, public and private, should be looking for 
dynamic interfaces. 
• The action plan is positioned alongside China’s Silk Road initiative, with similar 
connectivity, diversification and employment thrusts. In both frameworks, effective 
states and clean and green development are implicit and explicit agendas, with 
associated political economy complexities in varying national contexts. The links 
between development and security are more evident and urgent than ever, 
which the Johannesburg Action Plan and Silk Roads initiative capture. China has 
expressed its openness to working with others in these various arenas, which 
provides a unique opportunity for engagement.
• The action plan should thus be understood next to China’s other international 
initiatives, its own economic rebalancing, with accompanying domestic and global 
complexities, and its stated readiness to work with others and to jointly address 
the development–security nexus.
G20 Summit opportunities on geopolitical and transparency frontiers
The G20 Summit in Hangzhou in September 2016 will be an opportunity to reference 
the Johannesburg Action Plan in the G20 mainstream agenda:
• Recognising the new economic geography and financial institutions associated 
with Chinese leadership and the contributions to growth prospects in the global 
economy;
• Identifying constructive ways forward on current geopolitical fronts;
• Providing an occasion for China to announce concrete steps to provide greater 
transparency in its own development cooperation system, including its policy 
banks and state enterprises, as it works with others on international cooperation.
